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The Impact of Investment Treaty Law on Tax Policies of Host States

Yatırım Sözleşmeleri Hukukunun Ev Sahibi Devletlerin Vergi Politikalarına Etkisi

Alisher UMIRDINOV

It is assumed that investment treaty law has an impact on host state’s law and policy in achieving international investment agreements’ obligations as regards to the promotion of good governance and rule of law. Then the question to be asked is can investment treaty law certainly stimulate legal and policy reform in host countries? In other words, to what extent investment treaty law influences ex ante and ex post tax policies of host states? The question is almost untested in burgeoning international investment law with some very few exceptions. Using sensitive tax-related investment disputes as an objective of this study, the author argues that there is no direct influence of investment treaty law on changing the municipal law and policy of host states. It is not secret that states jealously protect their tax sovereignty. One can observe a dramatic increase of tax-related disputes (already more than thirty!) in investment arbitration in the last twenty years. Then, the host states are expected to incorporate emerging principles of investment arbitration into the domestic law and take them into their consideration during decision-making process in order to avoid burdensome liability. However, a careful empirical review of their behavior suggests that except in small fragile states, investment treaty law failed to have an impact on the regulatory systems of most of the host states. It is rather ironic that the spillover effect of investment treaty law appeared not on a domestic tax regulatory policy context, but in a form of revision/withdrawal/termination of international investment agreements.

IIAs, Tax Policy, Developing Countries, Domestic Legal System, Reform.

Yatırım sözleşmeleri hukukunun, iyi yönetim ve hukukun üstünlüğü ilkeleriyle ilgili olarak uluslararası yatırım antlaşmalarının yükümlülüklerine uygun davranma adına ev sahibi devletin hukuku ve politikaları üzerinde etkiye sahip olduğu düşünülür. Bu noktada sorulması gereken soru, yatırım antlaşmaları hukukunun ev sahibi ülkelerde yasal ve politika reformlarını canlandırabilir mi sorusudur. Diğer bir ifadeyle, yatırım antlaşmaları hukuku hangi ölçüde ev sahibi ülkelerin (ex ante ve ex post) vergi politikalarını etkileyebilir? Bu soru bazı istisnalar dışında yeni yeni filizlenen uluslararası yatırım hukukunda neredeyse cevaplanmamış bir soru. Makalenin yazarı, bu çalışmada vergiyle ilgili yatırım problemlerine dayanarak, yatırım antlaşmaları hukukunun ev sahibi devletlerin iç hukuku ve politikaları üzerinde doğrudan bir etkisi olmadığını savunmaktadır. Devletlerin kıskanç bir şekilde vergi egemenliklerini korudukları bir sır değil. Son yirmi yılda, yatırım tahkimlerinde vergiyle ilgili problemlerin (halihazırda %30’dan fazla) dramatik bir şekilde arttığı görülür. Böylece, ev sahibi devletlerin yatırım tahkiminde yeni ortaya çıkan ilkeleri iç hukuklarına aktarmaları ve ağır sorumluluktan kurtulmak için bu ilkeleri karar üretme süreçlerinde göz önünde bulundurmaları beklenir. Ancak, ev sahibi devletlerin bu konudaki davranışları üzerine ampirik bir bakış, küçük ve kırılgan bir kaç devlet dışında, yatırım antlaşmaları hukukunun ev sahibi devletlerin bir çoğunda düzenleyici sistemler üzerinde etkin olma şansını kaçırdığını önermektedir. Yatırım antlaşmaları hukukunun yayılma etkisinin devletlerin iç vergi düzenleme politikaları üzerinde değil de, uluslararası yatırım antlaşmalarının revizyonu/iptali/sona ermesi üzerinde etkin olması da bir hayli ironiktir.

Uluslararası Yatırım Antlaşmaları (UYA), Vergi Politikası, Gelişmekte Olan Ülkeler, İç Hukuk Sistemi, Reform.

1. INTRODUCTION

It is assumed that investment treaty law has an impact on host state's law and policy in achieving international investment agreement (IIAs)1 obligations as regards to the promotion of good governance and rule of law.2 Then the question to be asked is can investment treaty law certainly stimulate legal and policy reform in host countries? The question is almost untested in burgeoning international investment law with some very few exceptions.3

Using sensitive tax-related investment disputes as an objective of this study, I argue that there is no direct influence of international investment law on changing the municipal law and policy. Power to tax is inherent power of all sovereign states. In the past, countries were known for squeezing out foreign investments through the backdoor by means of taxation.4 As Justice Rufus Peckham rightly noted this double dimension of tax power in his judgment in Nicol v. Ames by saying that, 'it is not only the power to destroy but also the power to keep alive'.5 Nevertheless, one can see a dramatic increase of tax-related disputes (already more than thirty!) in investment arbitration in the last twenty years. If so, it is logical to assume that host states (executive, legislative and judicial bodies) are very concerned about such phenomenon and carefully following the investment tribunal's interpretation of vague fair and equitable treatment or national treatments regarding tax-related cases.6 Then, the host states are expected to incorporate emerging principles of investment arbitration into the domestic law and take them into their consideration during decision-making process in order to avoid burdensome liability.7

The empirical enquiry tells us a very different story, however. Among tax disputes, only small countries- such as Burundi in Africa agreed to reimburse foreign investor the taxes and custom duties it had to pay, and to create a new free zone regime.8 The natural resource rich countries such as Russia and Ecuador showed a great reluctance to compromise with foreign investors. While Russia intentionally made the investor bankrupt through retrospective taxation and doubtful bankruptcy procedures in series of notorious Yukos affair, Ecuador went to levy up to 99% of tax notwithstanding the threat of arbitration by foreign investors.9 Moreover, despite a victory in India's supreme court, a telecommunication major Vodafone couldn't stop Indian government from retrospectively amending the tax law making company pay $2.6bn tax.10